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Abstract. Diagrams have many uses in mathematics, one of the most
ambitious of which is as a form of proof. The domain we consider is
real analysis, where quantication issues are subtle but crucial. Com-
puters oer new possibilities in diagrammatic reasoning, one of which
is animation. Here we develop animated rules as a solution to problems
of quantication. We show a simple application of this to constraint di-
agrams, and also how it can deal with the more complex questions of
quantication and generalisation in diagrams that use more specic rep-
resentations. This allows us to tackle diÆcult theorems that previously
could only be proved algebraically.
1 Introduction
In adapting diagrammatic reasoning to computers, there is the exciting possibil-
ity of developing diagrams in new ways. Diagrams in textbooks are necessarily
static. However, if we consider the very real dierences between text and hy-
pertext, we see that diagrammatic reasoning on computers need not be just a
straight conversion of diagrammatic reasoning on paper. One such new direction
is the use of animation. In this paper we describe how animation can be applied
to represent and reason about quantication. Other applications are possible:
although unrelated to our present work, animated diagrams may also be use-
ful in representing and reasoning about temporal relations. There is an obvious
attraction in using time to represent itself.
1
From the very beginning of mathematics, diagrams have been used to give
proofs in subjects such as geometry and number theory. Nevertheless diagram-
matic proof is only partially understood today. In particular, we do not have a
general theory for handling quantication and the related topic of generalisation.
1
This would probably not be suitable for domains which involve precise time calcu-
lations, as these would be hard to judge in an animation. For qualitative reasoning
though, or as part of a mixed system, it seems an interesting line for future research.
2We identify three distinct problems in this area: quantier hierarchy, quanti-
er type and identifying generalisation conditions. In sentential reasoning, quan-
tier hierarchy is determined by reading from left-to-right. Quantier type is
determined by the semantics attached to the symbols 8; 9 (which are part of the
common language of scientists and mathematicians), and generalisation is con-
trolled by explicit conditions (e.g. 8A;B;C:triangle(ABC) ^ angle(A;B) =
90
o
) :::). Unfortunately these solutions do not naturally carry over to dia-
grams.
The use of two dimensions with several spatial relations being signicant
removes the neat left-to-right ordering on objects that we have in sentential
reasoning. For quantier type, we could try to label objects with the 8; 9 symbols
as in algebra, but it is not always clear which object such a label applies to,
especially if the diagram involves composite objects. Fig. 1 gives an example
of how this could be less than clear (does the 8 symbol apply to the closest
line, triangle or square?). Unlike algebra, where the conditions on a theorem
are explicitly stated, diagrams often contain a lot of information that may or
may not be relevant. Thus several generalisations are possible, some of which
may be false. For example in Fig. 1, we might generalise to `all triangles', `all
right angled triangles', or `all similar triangles
2
to the one drawn'. Often there
is a clear intuitive generalisation, but this must be formalised if we are to give
rigorous proofs (c.f. [9] for a detailed discussion of this). So diagrams require a
fresh approach to all three problems.
Fig. 1. Problems in Pythagoras' Theorem: It is not clear what the 8 symbol applies
to, and we have not specied which aspects of the triangle are important.
1.1 Related work
Several approaches have tackled the problem of quantication in diagrams by
introducing new notation. This can produce systems as powerful as predicate
logic. However, it generally leads to more complex diagrams, and great care is
required if these are to retain their intuitive feel. For example, in 1976 Schubert,
starting from semantic nets, developed (by adding more and more notation) a
diagrammatic representation that is as expressive as modal lambda calculus (see
Fig. 2) [12]. Unfortunately, the resulting diagrams are extremely diÆcult to read
and, to the best of our knowledge, were not generally used.
2
Two triangles are similar if they dier only in scale or left-right orientation.
3Fig. 2. A Schubert diagram for \Several children are on the playground. Most of them
are playing in the sandbox."
A more recent example is [8], which extends Venn diagrams with extra no-
tation and some inference rules to give a heterogenous system
3
as expressive as
rst-order predicate logic. It is shown to be sound and complete, but also seems
too diÆcult to use. As Ambrose Bierce's inventor said: \I have demonstrated
the correctness of my details, the defects are merely basic and fundamental" [2].
By extending diagram systems on purely logical criterion without considering
ease-of-use issues, the nal systems lost the very qualities that make diagrams
attractive.
Fig. 3. We are unsure what this Schubert diagram means.
A more successful diagrammatic system with quantiers is Gil et al 's con-
straint diagrams, which are an extension of spider diagrams [5]. The objects in
spider diagrams are oval contours (representing sets with overlap=intersection),
points (representing members of sets) and `spiders' (linked points representing
statements of the form x 2 A [B). Constraint diagrams introduce arrows (rep-
resenting relationships) and quantiers. Only points and spiders are quantied
over. Quantier type is handled by drawing points in dierent ways. That is,
they have dierent primitive objects for the dierent quantiers:  = 9point,
3
A system whose representations mix diagrams and text [1].
4? = 8points. Quantier ordering problems are dealt with by labelling quantiers
with numbers.
The solutions in [5] for handling quantication have similarities to the ones
we will present here. However the abstract indirect nature of constraint diagrams
makes them `closer' to algebra, and thus the problems are easier than for more
specic diagrams (c.f. x2.2).
The generalisation problem arises only in a limited form for [5]. This is be-
cause, except for set membership, all conditions must be made explicit { as in
algebra. Set membership conditions are handled by xing the interpretation: a
point x is interpreted as belonging to the smallest region containing it. `Spiders'
provide a means for over-riding this default interpretation. We shall look at how
this idea of a default reading with extra syntax to give other readings can be
extended to cover diagrams where a wide range of conditions can be represented.
Using dierent objects to represent quantier type would not be suitable for
our analysis diagrams, where we variously wish to quantify over points, sets,
functions, lengths, etc., as it would involve introducing multiple primitives for
each type of object. This would quickly get confusing.
2 Prerequisites: some denitions
2.1 Real analysis
Our work is in the domain of real analysis (which gives a rigorous underpinning
for calculus, and leads on to elds such as topology). Analysis is a form of geome-
try, but one whose dry algebraic formalism can make it hard to learn. This makes
it an attractive area for applying diagrammatic reasoning. We have implemented
a prototype interactive theorem prover using a diagrammatic logic [14]. Our aim
is to produce a teaching system based on this, so issues of comprehension and
understanding are paramount.
We follow Cauchy's    Æ analysis (also known as standard analysis), based
on arbitrarily small error terms [11]. Denitions often involve arbitrarily small




: jx   x
0
j < rg for the ball of radius r with
centre x (this notation is common but not universal). Our examples in this paper
will be based on open sets, which are dened as follows:
Denition 21. If X is open... open(X)) set(X)^8x 2 X; 9 > 0:B

(x)  X
Denition 22. X is open if... set(X);8x 2 X; 9 > 0:B

(x)  X ) open(X)
2.2 Diagrams
Diagrammatic representations are by their nature quite specic, however the
level of specicity varies. We introduce the term direct to informally describe
the degree of this. A more direct diagram is one where the representation used
is closely linked to its meaning. For example drawing a triangle to reason about
triangles. By contrast, an indirect diagram is one where the relation between
5sign and meaning is arbitrary, and based on convention. Constraint diagrams
are an example of this, where a dot can represent anything from a spatial point
to a person. Textual representations are always indirect.
In general, the closer the link between signier and signied,
4
the more spe-
cic the representations are (i.e. more direct diagrams tend to be more specic).
Specic representations lead to the generalisation problem outlined in x1. Also,
it seems that the more specic the representations are, the harder it is to prop-
erly perform universal quantication. This is because there is extra information
that the user must ignore. For example, it is easier to reason with `let X repre-
sent any man...' than `let the late Jon Barwise, who had fading brown hair and
contributed so much to diagrammatic reasoning, represent any man...'. Never-
theless, specic representations do seem to have strong advantages. In particular,
more direct diagrams give representations for geometric objects which are both
very natural, and seem to lend themselves well to diagrammatic reasoning. See
[7] or [13] for discussions of this issue. Our domain is in geometry, hence we have
adopted a system based on fairly direct diagrams. This gives us quite natural
representations for many of the objects in the domain, but makes quantication
a diÆcult issue.
Our diagrams consist of labelled graphical objects with relations between
them. Relations may be represented either graphically or algebraically (this
makes our representations heterogenous, although we will continue to refer to
them as diagrams).
2.3 Proof system
Often diagrammatic reasoning is presented as a question of interpreting static
diagrams. Here we consider dynamic diagrammatic reasoning, where the process
of drawing is important, as opposed to just the nished diagram.
Our logic is dened using redraw rules, which are similar to rewrite rules
but transform diagrams rather than formulae. This reects our belief that di-
agrammatic reasoning is often linked to the drawing process, rather than just
the nished diagram. These rules are expressed diagrammatically by an example




, consists of an initial diagram
(D
0
, the antecedent or pre-condition) and a modied diagram (D
1
, the conse-
quent, or post-condition). Fig. 4 gives an example redraw rule.













 = 1), and are also expressed
diagrammatically (i.e. as redraw rules). A proof consists of a demonstration that
the antecedent of the theorem can always be redrawn to give the consequent
diagram using an accepted set of rules (i.e. the axioms). Hence a proof is a chain
of diagrams, starting with the theorem antecedent and ending with the theorem
consequent. We refer to an incomplete or complete proof as a reasoning chain.
Informally, the procedure for applying a simple rule is:
4
A signier is the method (e.g. a word or picture) used to represent a concept (the
signied); together they make up a sign [4].
6Fig. 4. Denition 21 as a redraw rule.
1. The antecedent diagram is matched with some part of the working diagram
(i.e. the last diagram in the reasoning chain).
2. The working diagram is modied in an equivalent way to the modication
between the antecedent and consequent diagrams. This modied diagram is
added to the end of the reasoning chain.
The principal dierences from rewrite rules are:
{ There can be an innite number of valid (but equivalent) redrawings for a
given diagram, a given rule and a given matching (e.g. a rule may specify
that a point should be drawn, but leave open the choice of which point to
draw).
{ Due to the problem of multiple possible generalisations, there is no clear
choice for how the matching algorithm should work.
Fig. 4 shows how Denition 21 can be implemented as a redraw rule. The an-
tecedent will match any point y in any open set Y ; the consequent guarantees
the existence of a ball B

(y)  Y .
Consider implementing the converse rule (Denition 22). This denition can
be read as `X is open if, given any point x in X , we can nd an  > 0 such
thatB

(x)  X '. Note the verb `we can nd...' { this condition can be thought
of as dynamic: it gives a type of behaviour which we must demonstrate to show
that X is open (by contrast, the conditions in Denition 21 can be thought of
as adjectival). Static diagrams are not well suited to representing behaviour.
They are better suited to adjectives than verbs. Instead, we introduce animated
redraw rules. An animation here is a chain of diagrams. Animated redraw rules
have an animation as their pre-condition. Where simple redraw rules match the
last diagram in the reasoning chain, animated rules must match a section of
the reasoning chain.
5
Fig. 5 gives an example redraw rule with an animated
antecedent.
5
The full system includes two further types of rule for case-split introduction and case
elimination.
7Fig. 5. Denition 22 as an animated redraw rule. The terms strict and exible are
explained in section 3.3.
3 Using animation for quantication
3.1 Quantier hierarchy
As with sentential reasoning, quantier order can be important. Animation gives
a reliable and intuitive ordering without introducing extra notation. This is be-
cause of causality: it is obvious that object A cannot depend on object B if B
was drawn after A. Fig. 6 gives an example based on the joke \Every minute,
somewhere in the world a woman gives birth. We must nd this woman and
stop her." This shows how animation in a very simple way eliminates the order-
ing ambiguity which allows two conicting interpretations of the rst sentence.
Structurally this is equivalent to quantier numbering in [5], although in pre-
sentational terms it is very dierent.
Fig. 6. `For any minute, there is a woman who gives birth' vs. `There is a woman
who gives birth every minute'. The second diagram is identical for both cases, but the
starting diagram shows which object comes rst.
83.2 Generalisation
In our logic, a matching algorithm allows redraw rules to be applied to a wide
range of diagrams. Thus the matching algorithm determines generalisation of
the rule (and vice-versa: specifying generalisations would establish a matching
criterion) [14]. As discussed in x1, there are often several possible generalisations,
hence several matching algorithms are possible. It seems unlikely that there will
be a canonical answer to the question of what aspects of a diagram should be
read as generalisation conditions.
We could simply make all the relevant information explicit in the diagram,
and assume everything else is unimportant. However this would make for clut-
tered, less legible, diagrams. A more sensible approach is to have a default inter-
pretation that certain aspects of a diagram are assumed to be important. Ideally,
this should be the same as the intuitive reading of the diagram. The conditions
specied by this default interpretation can be strengthened or relaxed, but only
through explicit conditions in the diagram. Spider diagrams show how this can
be used for representing set membership, where spiders are used to override the
default reading. It can be extended to cover other relations. Some of the default
readings we use are:
{ Lengths are considered unimportant (to be generalised), unless a statement
of the form length(A) < length(B) or length(A) = B is added.
{ Right angles are considered salient,
6
unless the angle is tagged with a ]
symbol indicating an aribtrary angle.
3.3 Quantier behaviour
Statements in our logic are expressed as rules, hence the question of `how do
quantiers behave?' becomes `when should a rule antecedent match a reasoning
chain?' That is, the question of what does a diagram/animation mean is recast
as `what diagrams/reasoning chains does it match?'
We have to be careful working in direct diagrams, as a quantied object is also
a specic example.
7
For example, when reasoning about an abstract universally
quantied point, we must nevertheless draw a particular point, and this point will
have properties that do not hold universally. However, as long as such properties
are not used in the reasoning that follows, they will not aect the generality of
the proof. The reasoning that follows would work for any point, so it does not
matter which point was actually drawn. The specic case that is drawn comes
to represent a class of equivalent cases. What matters is that the reasoning is
generic (with indirect representations, this is automatically enforced by using
generic objects; with direct representations the generality of the reasoning must
be checked).
Consider again Fig. 5, where there is a universally quantied point x in the
middle of the rule antecedent. Suppose we wish to apply this rule to show that
6
Assumed to be an intentional feature and therefore not to be generalised.
7
To be precise, it is interpreted as a specic example.
9the set Y = B
1
((0; 0)) is open. First we introduce an arbitrary point y 2 Y to
match the point x in the rule antecedent. We still have further reasoning to do
before the rule will match: we have to nd an -ball about y that lies within
the set Y . The reasoning that follows must be universally applicable, which
means that it must not use the specic nature of the point y, only the fact that
y 2 Y . For example, suppose we concluded B
0:1
(y)  Y from y = (0:7; 0:8).
The reasoning is sound, but it does not apply to other values of y. Our chain of
reasoning nds an  for y = (0:7; 0:8), but this reasoning could not be applied
to any point. Hence the rule { which requires that such an  exists for any point
{ is not applicable If the reasoning that follows draws on non-universal aspects
of the point, then we say that the point y has been compromised ; it is no longer
universally quantied. This is simple to check: an object is compromised if later
reasoning alters its generalisation (by adding extra conditions).
This leads us to the following method for reliably enforcing generic reasoning:









are diagrams. When a universally quantied object is introduced into
the proof, it must be done exactly as shown in the rule. The interpretation
of the object introduced into the reasoning chain must be equivalent to the
interpretation of the object introduced in the rule antecedent. If diagram D
i

















and no other modications (i.e.
no extra constructions or conditions). Moreover, subsequent reasoning on P
j+1
must not compromise the new universally quantied object drawn. This ensures
that the reasoning that follows will be as general as the rule requires.
When the rule antecedent contains an existentially quantied object, all that
must be shown is that some matching object can be constructed in the reasoning
chain. How this is done does not matter (as long as it does not compromise a
universally quantied object). Hence an existentially quantied object can be
drawn in any manner using several redraw operations, since all we require for
the rule antecedent to match is that some such object exists. If diagram D
j





exible transition. A exible transition allows arbitrary other constructions to
be drawn in the reasoning chain when moving from one diagram in the rule to
the next.
For example, to prove the theorem open(B
r
(x)) takes 11 steps in our logic.





in Fig. 7). The rst step is to introduce an arbitrary point in B
r
(x) to match
the universally quantied point in diagram D
1
, Fig. 5. It then takes three steps
to construct a suitable -ball (P
5
in Fig. 7) and ve more steps to show that




). All these steps are performed using simple


















, as shown in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 7. Sketch proof for open(B
x
(r)). Space limitations prevent us giving the full proof
or the rules used.
Fig. 8. Antecedent matching with strict and exible transitions.
The method described above syntactically prescribes quantier type in rule
antecedents in terms of the matching criterion regarding transitions.
3.4 Quantication in the rule consequent
Rule consequents are always a single diagram containing new objects or new con-
ditions.
8
New objects are assumed to be existentially quantied. More complex
inferences can be expressed in this formalism by two rules linked with a syntactic
tag. For example, the statement p ) 9x:8y:q(x; y) would be converted into two
rules: p ) 9x:r(x) and r(x); y ) q(x; y), where r is the syntactic tag created
to link the two.
3.5 Representing quantier type
A side-benet of animation is that it clears up labelling ambiguities. When deal-
ing with emergent or composite objects (i.e. objects formed as a result of drawing
other objects, such as some of the squares in Fig. 1), it is not necessarily clear
what object a label applies to. However if objects are introduced one at a time
8
If we allowed objects/conditions to be deleted or changed it would give a non-
monotonic logic.
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with their labels, then this ambiguity vanishes. In our logic we require a reason-
ing step to recognise a composite object, so composite objects are `drawn' (and
labelled) after their parts.
With labelling ambiguity removed, we could simply reinstate the algebraic
symbols 8; 9 and represent quantier type by labelling objects with them. Dia-
grams also allow other, potentially more interesting, possibilities. These include
some form of drawing convention, such as colour-coding or using dierent shaped
objects. Or { since quantiers are introduced one at a time { quantier type can
be represented by having dierent transitions between frames in the animation.
Any of these representation methods would be suÆcient to distinguish the
two quantier types, but they have dierent advantages. Using the established
symbols gives the user something they may already be familiar with. Colour-
coding is `cleaner' since it does not introduce extra labelling, and this may aid
comprehension.
Both of the above methods rely purely on convention for their meaning. How-
ever, since quantier behaviour (i.e. their syntactic meaning) comes from the
diagram transitions, we could also represent quantiers by labelling the transi-
tions. A more interesting option is to use special transitions that can attempt
to convey the dierence in meaning. These special transitions are animations of
a dierent kind. They are independent of the reasoning rather than a part of it.
For example, a universally quantied point could `roam it's habitat', indicating
that it is not a specic point. With an existentially quantied object in a rule
antecedent, the transition could indicate `miscellaneous drawing' to illustrate
that, when applying the rule, other unspecied constructions will be necessary
at this stage. Such an approach would not be of interest to professional users,
but could be helpful in teaching applications. However the quantier type is not
visible in the nal diagram. To a certain extent, the strengths and weaknesses of
these representation methods complement each other, and so they can be com-
bined. We currently use a combination of colour-coding and special transitions,
although in the future the system will be customisable to a user's preferences.
Colour-coding is identical at the syntactic level to the dierent primitive objects
used in [5], plus it can be used uniformly across types of object that are drawn in
quite dierent ways { although it does restrict the use of colour for representing
other properties.
4 Open issues
Consider the rule in Fig. 5. The natural way of using this rule requires at least
one point in the set - so it cannot be applied to the empty set. This introduces
a dilemma: our denition of an open set is slightly dierent from the standard
one in that it excludes the empty set. The cause of this discrepancy is that our
diagrammatic universal quantier has existential import. That is, the statement
8x 2 X implies 9x 2 X . This is also true in aristotelian logic [10] and natural
language, but of course false in predicate calculus. Currently we handle the empty
12
set as a special case. However, since correspondence with conventional logic is
desirable in mathematical domains, this is not ideal.
5 Converting animated rules into quantied rules
So far we have described how sentential rules correspond to animated diagram-
matic rules. Now we look into how animated diagrammatic rules correspond to
the sentential ones. The concept of well-formed formulae (w) can be translated
to diagrams. We assume the following loose denition of a well formed diagram
(wfd) here:
Denition 51. Suppose we have a diagram language L consisting of graphical
objects, labelling constants and rst-order predicates, and for each property that
can be inferred from the diagrams, there is a corresponding predicate in L (i.e.
any diagram in L can also be described purely algebraically in L). Then say:
{ The empty diagram is a wfd.





used in A, then A [X is a wfd.
{ If A is a wfd, X some objects in A and p(X) a predicate in L, then A[p(X)
is a wfd, where p(X) could be drawn either graphically or algebraically using
object labels.
Are any conjunctions of predicates allowed? Since we are using heterogenous
diagrams, any combination can be stated, but there are sensible restrictions that
could be made (e.g. disallowing point(X) ^ line(X)).
5.1 Well formed formulae
Let us assume we have an interpretation function I that maps single diagrams
to unquantied algebraic statements in a suitable domain. Let X denote a
vector of variables, let p; q denote any conjunction of predicates in L (e.g.


















. Simple rules correspond to statements of the form:
X:p(X) ) q(X)
Here, p(X) = I(D
0




) (with the natural mapping between
labels and variables).




, we can add another diagram D
n+1
to it in two ways:
1. With a exible transition, introducing existentially quantied objects:
If A ) B is a w, var(A) are the variables (free and bound) in A, and
X \ var(A) = ; then
A; 9X:p(var(A); X) ) B is a w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2. With a strict transition, introducing universally quantied objects:
If A ) B is a w, var(A) are the variables (free and bound) in A, and





);8X:p(var(A); X) ) B is a w
5.2 Example animated redraw rule (Fig. 5) revisited
Following the correspondences given above and assuming the behaviour of inter-













































Hence the redraw rule converts to the algebraic rule:
set(X); X 6= ;;8x 2 X; 9 > 0:B

(x)  X ) open(X)
which is almost Denition 22. As explained in x4 we currently need a seperate
redraw rule to cover the case X = ;.
6 Conclusions & future work
Real analysis is a domain where great care is required to avoid mistakes, and
where quantier ordering is often important. As part of our project to produce
a diagrammatic formalisation for this subject, we have developed rules with an-
imated pre-conditions. This paper demonstrates how these rules work, showing
how they allow us to perform generic quantied reasoning with specic repre-
sentations. We hope that this has applications to other elds; any domain that
considers dynamic behaviour seems promising. A second type of animation (spe-
cial transitions for representing quanier type) is also introduced to give more
meaningful representations.
The treatment given in x5 is quite loose. We intend to develop a formal
semantics for animated redraw rules, plus a formal denition of our interpretation
function and matching criterion (whose behaviour we have assumed here). This
should then allow us to show equivalence between redraw rules and algebraic
rules.
There are drawbacks to our method of representing and reasoning about
quantication. The issue of existential import raises serious questions. The use
of colour to represent quantier type severely limits the way in which colour
can be used elsewhere in the diagram. Also, the extra dimension of time in the
14
representations might prove to be harder for users because of `overloading' un-
derstanding through extra demands on working memory. Perhaps the greatest
drawback of animation is that it is not suited to being printed (e.g. in textbooks
or papers), except as cumbersome comic strips where the simplicity of the rep-
resentation is lost. Note that to a certain extent, this does not apply to its use
on blackboards, where animation can be performed, albeit a little crudely.
However the advantages are a logic that is, we hope, more elegant and natural
to use. Using animation to extend diagrams avoids extra labelling and should be
more intuitive, since it draws on cause-and-eect for meaning rather than requir-
ing conventions. Moreover rules with animated pre-conditions focus attention on
the reasoning used in a proof. This could be benecial from an educational point
of view. Using extra notation it is possible to avoid the use of animation within
our system. For example, Fig. 9 gives a non-animated version of the redraw rule
in Fig. 5. We feel that by compressing all the information into one diagram, the
non-animated version obscures the relations between the objects. We will test
student responses to this dierence as part of our system evaluation. We are also
investigating how expressive our analysis diagrams are (i.e. how good a coverage
of theorems we can achieve). Our preliminary work suggests that diagrammatic
reasoning can be successful in teaching this domain [14].
Fig. 9. Static redraw rule dening an open set.
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